Puppet CVE-2026-115731 is now on CISA’s list of vulnerabilities that attackers are actively exploiting. On November 17, 2026, the agency added the critical Perforce Puppet flaw to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The bug carries a CVSS score of 9.4. It lets a client with a signed agent certificate run its own code on the Puppet Server.
That matters far beyond one server. Puppet is the system that tells thousands of other machines how to configure themselves. An attacker who controls it does not just own one box. They can reach the whole fleet it manages, and they can steal the keys that decide which machines the fleet trusts.
What Happened With Puppet CVE-2026-115731
A Fix Shipped Two Weeks Before the Warning
Perforce published its advisory and fixed builds on November 3, 2026. The OpenVox project, the community fork of Puppet, released its own fixes on the same day. Alain Rödel of the German security firm Neodyme AG found and reported the flaw.
CISA Confirms Real Attacks
Two weeks later, CISA listed the bug in KEV. The agency only adds a flaw to that catalog when it has evidence of exploitation in the wild. CISA has not named an attacker or a campaign. It gave US federal agencies until December 1, 2026, to patch.
A Second Bug in the Same Disclosure
The same research also produced CVE-2026-115732, a certificate-name authorization bypass rated 9.0. Neodyme warns about the bigger prize. An attacker with code execution on a Puppet server can grab the CA signing keys and impersonate other hosts.
Puppet decides what every server becomes. Whoever controls Puppet decides too.
How the Attack Works
Agents Send Reports to the Server
Every Puppet agent checks in with the Puppet Server and sends back a report of its last run. The agent uploads that report with an HTTP PUT request. The report endpoint exists on every Puppet Server, so almost every install exposes it.
The Server Trusts the Report Too Much
The bug is a classic unsafe deserialization flaw (CWE-502). When the server reads event data in a report, it rebuilds Puppet “rich data” types from it. An attacker can shape that data so the server builds and runs Ruby code. The code then runs as the Puppet Server’s service user.
The Only Gate Is a Certificate
The attacker needs a client certificate that the Puppet Certificate Authority has signed. In a well-run setup, that means they must first compromise one managed machine. That is a low bar in a fleet of thousands.
Autosign Removes the Gate Entirely
Many teams turn on autosign so new machines join without manual approval. If the CA signs requests without strong checks, anyone on the network can request a certificate and get one. At that point the flaw works without any prior access.
A Public Exploit Exists
The OpenVox GitHub advisory includes a working proof of concept. It shows a crafted report that runs a shell command on the server. Defenders should assume attackers have studied it too.
Who Is Affected
The flaw hits commercial Puppet Enterprise, open-source Puppet Core and the OpenVox fork. These are the affected lines and the first fixed release for each:
- Puppet Enterprise 2026: 2026.0.0 is affected. Fixed in 2026.0.1.
- Puppet Enterprise 2025: 2025.0.0 to 2025.12.0 are affected. Fixed in 2025.12.1.
- Puppet Enterprise 2023.8: 2023.8.0 to 2023.8.12 are affected. Fixed in 2023.8.13.
- Puppet Core: fixed in 9.1.3 and 8.22.2.
- OpenVox: fixed in Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0, and in Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0.
OpenVox users should update both the server and the agents. Package numbers differ between vendors, so check each vendor’s own channel rather than matching version strings by eye.
Why Configuration Management Is a Crown Jewel
One Server, Thousands of Targets
Tools like Puppet, Ansible and Chef push code and settings to every server they manage. That is their job. It also means a single compromise can spread a backdoor to the entire estate in one run.
Stolen CA Keys Break Trust Itself
Puppet’s trust model rests on its own certificate authority. If attackers take the CA keys, they can mint certificates for any host name. Patching alone will not remove them. The only clean fix is to rebuild the CA and reissue every certificate.
The Patch Window Keeps Shrinking
The fix came out on November 3, and attacks followed before most teams had scheduled it. We saw the same pattern with Java4Shell in enterprise Java and with the Cisco BroadWorks KEV case. Management infrastructure now needs the same fast patch cycle as an internet-facing VPN.
Your management plane is now an attack surface. Patch it like one.
What to Do Now About Puppet CVE-2026-115731
1. Patch the Puppet Server First
Upgrade Puppet Enterprise, Puppet Core or OpenVox to a fixed build. Then restart the puppetserver service so the new code loads.
2. Turn Off Weak Autosign
Check the setting with puppet config print autosign and review autosign.conf. Disable autosign or switch to policy-based signing that verifies each request. This closes the unauthenticated path, but it does not fix the bug.
3. Restrict Access to Port 8140
Limit TCP 8140 to the agents and consoles that truly need it. The Puppet Server should never face the open internet.
4. Hunt for Signs of Abuse
List every signed certificate with puppetserver ca list --all and look for names you do not recognize. Search the access log for PUT /puppet/v3/report requests from unknown certificate names. Review new processes and recently changed files owned by the puppet user.
5. Assume CA Compromise If You Find Anything
An unknown certificate or any trace of code execution changes the job. Rebuild the server, rotate the CA and reissue all agent certificates. Also rotate secrets that Puppet manifests or Hiera data can reach.
The Bigger Lesson
The real lesson of CVE-2026-115731 is about where trust lives. Security teams guard firewalls and VPNs closely. Yet the systems that configure everything else often sit in a quiet corner with old settings and slow patch cycles.
Attackers have noticed. Build pipelines, package registries and management servers give them reach that a single endpoint never could. The recent Microsoft agent-framework PyPI compromise showed the same idea from the supply-chain side.
Treat Puppet, its CA and its secrets as tier-zero assets. Give them the same monitoring, access control and patch speed as your domain controllers.
Want to go deeper on securing the tools that build and run your infrastructure? Read our analysis of how one poisoned package release stole cloud secrets.
Lock down the system that manages your systems before someone else manages it for you.

It is a critical unsafe deserialization flaw in Puppet Server’s report processing, rated CVSS 9.4. A client with a CA-signed agent certificate can send a crafted report and run code on the server as its service user.
Yes. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17, 2026, based on evidence of active exploitation. A public proof of concept is also available.
Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13, Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2, and OpenVox Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0 with Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0.
They need a certificate signed by the Puppet CA. If autosign accepts requests without strong checks, an attacker on the network can get one without any prior access.
No. It removes the easiest path, but a stolen agent certificate still reaches the vulnerable code. You must install the fixed version.
Treat the Puppet CA as compromised. Rebuild the server, rotate the CA, reissue all agent certificates and rotate secrets that Puppet can access.


